Pandemic Planning and Preparedness Guidelines for the UN System

This document was designed to be a guide for contingency planning around avian influenza (avian flu or bird flu) for United Nations (UN) agencies, and may also be used by non-governmental organisations (NGOS) and other organisations. It is intended to promote a consistent and harmonised approach, outlining the essential UN System issues and policies, and providing broad scenarios and key pointers for all offices in the UN System. The checklists and templates may be used to create a contingency plan that addresses the key threats and risks posed by avian influenza, including the possibility of a human pandemic. These guidelines outline three possible futures: a pandemic virus that emerges rapidly, slowly, or not at all.

The key planning and preparedness actions are:

• Appoint a pandemic influenza coordinator to prepare plans and monitor preparedness;
• Implement the revised UN Medical Services Staff Contingency Plan;
• Analyse and prioritise the threats and risks to staff health and safety, programme and operational continuity; then develop the hazard, risk and contingency analysis into detailed locally relevant scenarios, including one for a containment response where quarantine would be imposed for several weeks in the area where a pandemic virus first emerges. Use the scenarios to build plans that:
1. prioritise which programmes to maintain during different stages of a pandemic; and identify critical functions that will be needed to maintain operations;
2. define the critical staff (and alternates) to enable this, and ensure that each one is able to
   undertake multiple functions to cover for the absences of other critical staff;
3. review the adequacy of facilities, supplies and equipment needed to maintain critical
   operations and support staff, and make additional provisions if required;
4. review existing security procedures, and data to ensure that they are up to
   date and appropriate for response in a pandemic;
5. establish the administrative and financial policies for a pandemic, including
   actions required to reduce the risk of transmission at work.
• support national pandemic planning and preparedness; defining office and programme specific
  roles in the national response; and help mobilise funds needed for preparedness

According to the document, the broad influenza scenarios pose a direct threat to the social and economic welfare of countries, and the life and livelihoods of their citizens. A pandemic could threaten livelihoods as birds are culled, and result in a significant percentage of the population being ill or dying. The impact on traditionally vulnerable
populations (such as displaced persons, or ethnic minorities) may be severe, especially if they are excluded from public health messages, monitoring or treatment. As the crisis evolves there is likely to be increased demand placed on governments, and anxiety amongst the population. There may also be deterioration of individual, family and community coping and support mechanisms as well as disruptions to trade and commerce; to agriculture and food industries; degraded labour force both on a national and international level; and interruption of regular infrastructure and supply systems.



In order to mitigate and restore the above, following a possible outbreak, there will be a need to focus on:

• surveillance and detection of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI);
• prevention of animal outbreaks;
• containment through control of animal disease;
• raising public awareness about avian influenza and the risk of virus transmission from poultry to humans;
• prevention of human infection by fostering community resilience: ensuring that people
  have proper information about behaviour changes, and hygienic practices needed to reduce
  infection risk, and that they are helped to apply them - at individual, family and community
  levels;
• responding to livelihood shocks and increases in vulnerability resulting from the
  avian epizootic and the impact of efforts to contain it;
• communication of accurate information to the general public about pandemic influenza
  threat;
• mobilisation of required behavioural changes at the community and household level;
• engagement of all relevant professional and scientific stakeholders;
• containment of human influenza outbreaks at pandemic alert level 4 through the
  rapid detection and care of human cases and prevention of human-to-human transmission of
  the pathogen; and
• response efforts at pandemic alert levels 5 and 6; while minimising disruption to people’s
  access to basic needs and vital services.

The first step in the contingency planning process involves the collection and analysis of information
regarding the hazards that threaten UN operations: in this case the ongoing avian influenza epizootic
and potential human influenza pandemic. Information that needs to be collected includes analysis on
the potential impact of pandemic influenza on continuity of operations, human health, governance
and security, social and humanitarian needs, economic and social systems. Of particular importance in this assessment is the identification and location of vulnerable populations.

The planning document suggests that the contingency plan be developed through a process of scenario building to look at the various impact that an avian flu outbreak may have. For each contingency and scenario combination pandemic preparedness and response plans must address such things as management, coordination, training and public communication and advocacy strategies, particularly to vulnerable groups. A Country Team Communication Plan should also be developed to achieve effective communication to staff, stakeholders, communities and the media. Once the contingency plans are developed, it is then necessary to translate this into preparedness action plans with clearly assigned responsibilities and timelines for implementation.