Managing for and Communicating Development Results: Background Paper

This paper provides an overview of the benefits and challenges of giving a more prominent role to communication in results-based management. Prepared for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Informal Network of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Development Communicators (DevCom Network), it is designed for 3 audiences: government communication professionals in the field of development; government officials working on results-based management; and the wider aid community.

The Introduction highlights the growing emphasis on managing for results. "Recent changes in the aid environment - including the advent of budget support, emergence of new donors and aid modalities, and growing focus on harmonisation, alignment and ownership - have led to a greater focus on accountability and transparency, cementing the pivotal importance of delivering and managing for results." Author Peter da Costa notes that the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs, 2000), Monterrey Consensus (2002), and Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) have been pivotal in advocating the importance of results. Alongside this, there is growing acknowledgment of the importance of communicating results; evidence shared here highlights the potential of communication as a tool for the improved effectiveness of aid. Reportedly, a number of aid ministries and agencies are internalising communication for results in their discourse and practice on aid. However, Da Costa notes that critical mass has not yet been achieved in this regard.

Section 1 highlights key aspects of Results-Based Management (RBM) - the idea of using empirical evidence as a basis for learning from past experience and using the information to manage better in the future - and the Managing for Development Results (MfDR) approach, a management strategy with a focus on outcomes and impacts, a strong evidence-basis, and a suite of practical tools. In this context, Da Costa explores the role of the DAC Joint Venture on Managing for Development Results (JV MfDR), which is made up of a group of bilateral donors, multilateral development organisations - including the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the regional development banks - and partner country representatives.

Section 2 highlights the distinction between "communicating about results" and "communicating for results". The first type, also known as "corporate communication", involves harnessing development results to communicate to taxpayers that aid is working. With its focus on delivering accountability, this type of communication is largely directed at stakeholders external to the agency in question. The second type, also known as "communication for development" or "strategic communication", privileges a role for communication throughout the programme cycle, as opposed to exclusively as a dissemination function at the end of the programme. Internally, the emphasis is on harnessing communication as a tool for internal learning towards more joined-up action. Externally, communication engages project or programme beneficiaries and other key stakeholders, including government officials and policymakers. Da Costa highlights the United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development (DFID)'s results orientation, characterised by a strong commitment to integrating communication into programmes and projects. "Unlike a number of other OECD agencies whose communicating about results focus is almost exclusively on donor publics, DFID's Strategy emphasises dual accountability - to the UK public as well as to the recipients of assistance." This example is meant to illustrate Da Costa's conviction that, despite significant differences between the two communication approaches, they are complementary and relevant.

Section 3 reflects on the synergies and common cause between communication and RBM/MfDR, noting that communicators and aid programme managers are united by the imperative of reporting on development results in a way that accurately conveys progress. Both must be able to attribute progress to the aid their agency is giving towards addressing poverty; herein lies a major challenge. A list of other challenges communicators face in effectively communicating results is located on page 14 of the paper. Da Costa explains that underpinning all these challenges is the fact that "communicators and programme managers lack a common understanding as to the meaning of 'results'. Often, this is a false dichotomy as programme managers, even though they fully recognise the long-run nature of change, are as much under pressure to demonstrate 'quick-wins' as agency communicators are to produce success stories."

Da Costa explains that, in order to communicate results effectively, communicators need two types of results ("Neither is mutually exclusive, with a combination of the two approaches offering the best chance of success"):

• Quantitative results: up-to-date, accurate, easy to analyse statistics showing tangible progress. Such information usually comes in numerical form, and tries to show link inputs (how much money was put into a particular project or programme) to results (what difference was made as a result of the investment). Aid agencies tend not to be able to provide such data on a consistent basis; where they are able, this tends to be a costly and time-consuming process.
• Qualitative results: This model involves mainly field-based aid agency staff identifying, writing up, and sending narrative reports and where possible photographs, audio, and video content on in-country successes attributed to the inputs from the given programme or project. The communication department at headquarters then packages and disseminates the stories to the public via websites, radio, TV, or other communication media. The idea is that if the story is told in a compelling way, the audience will empathise with the individuals or communities featuring in the story, thereby validating their support for aid. "While success stories tend to be much more accessible to donor publics than numbers, they can be perceived as lacking in context and depth, and in some cases be perceived as aid agency-serving propaganda."
  

Da Costa reflects on the fact that it has yet to be fully established whether the RBM/ MfDR system can really make a difference in improving development results from aid. That said, "if ways can be found to integrate communication into RBM/MfDR in the process of iteration, there would be mutual learning on both sides. The demonstration effect would then provide a strong incentive for active collaboration between results managers and communicators." Another incentive Da Costa describes for RBM/MfDR is that the more communicators can disseminate information about results, the more credibility citizens attribute to aid and the aid system, and the more likely it becomes for them to want to continue to support aid with the taxes they pay. While communication for development is as much about process as it is about output, "a rich body of evidence exists demonstrating the pivotal role that communication for development has played in successful programme and project delivery."

The concluding section distils key principles and success factors. Among the key principles, the paper argues that attributing the impact of aid to the specific agency should only be a residual objective of communicating about results. Instead, telling a compelling story about how aid as a system is making a significant contribution to wider development efforts is likely to have far-reaching impact.

The paper ends with proposals for key stakeholder groups: communicators, aid managers, and evaluators. For instance, the practical lessons for communicators detailed here include:

• Recognising the complexity of MfDR/RBM and understand that finding the right stories is not always easy;
• Being pragmatic: start by engaging with colleagues on basis of good personal contact, and then widen the net;
• Striking a judicious balance between using qualitative and quantitative data;
• Engaging at high level (Ministerial, executive-level leadership) to convince of the need for results communication and get a mandate;
• Reaching out to senior civil servants after having convinced politicians;
• Identifying and providing communication support to internal champions to show the way;
• Identifying and using incentives to make a case;
• Building toolkits and story templates and make them available on agency intranets and extranets;
• Providing seed funding to projects or cash awards for results stories;
• Providing technical support to project and programme managers;
• Using public opinion research to lobby for staff acceptance of communication;
• Strengthening internal communication, continually emphasising knowledge and communication for development capacity building;
• Managing public expectations through honest and credible communication; and
• Getting messages out through third parties, who may be more credible than government spokespersons.

With specific reference to communication for development, Da Costa urges communicators to:

• Build internal awareness of what is essentially a new agenda to increase agency-wide understanding;
• Gather, consolidate, and present evidence that communication for development works (the evidence on programme communication as a "public good" is not well known);
• Get high-level buy-in (reach out to the Minister as opposed to the executive board);
• Produce toolkits and offer staff training;
• Include communication for development in organisational project design manuals; and
• Use existing forums to foster learning from experiences of donors that are closer to the cutting edge in terms of integrating communication for development in projects and programmes.