Disinformation Pathways and Effects: Case Studies from Five African Countries

"The disinformation industry is growing on the continent and is prevalent during election periods and whenever there is ethnic, political, religious or other social conflicts."



This report explores the nature, perpetrators, strategies and pathways of disinformation in Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda, as well as its effects on democratic actors such as civil society, bloggers, government critics, and activists. The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) hopes that the evidence generated will inform multi-stakeholder advocacy for greater transparency and robust action by platforms and governments to minimise harms and to combat disinformation.



Following a discussion of the context in each of the five countries, the report outlines the study results, which are based on key informant interviews with 90 respondents, including human rights defenders, telecom regulators and intermediaries, judicial officials, digital rights advocates, social media activists, influencers, bloggers, journalists, disinformation researchers, and fact-checkers. A literature review on disinformation and the related laws in each country was also conducted.



The report shares the results around the manifestations, drivers and trends, the actors, and digital pathways of disinformation. It also looks at the effects on democracy and human rights and at the countries' responses to disinformation.  



In terms of manifestations, for example, the research found that common tactics used by disinformation actors include mass sharing, which leverages the viral power of social media and the lucrative nature of disinformation for "influencers for hire". There is also a significant rise in political astroturfing, mass brigading, and the use of fake and pseudonymous social media accounts. Coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) on Facebook and Twitter is prevalent, too, and between 2019 and 2021, Facebook dismantled several such schemes, some of which perpetuated disinformation, with many linked to French and Russian actors.



According to the report, elections and armed conflicts are key drivers of disinformation. Yet authoritarianism has played a big part too, as governments have used both disinformation and the response to it to entrench themselves in power, shrink civic space, and target opponents and critics. In particular, the increased use of digital technologies, low media literacy levels, lucrative nature of disinformation, fractious politics (Kenya and Uganda), conflict situations (such as in Ethiopia, Cameroon, and Nigeria), and closure of civic space that makes offline speech dangerous (Uganda, Ethiopia, Cameroon) fuel disinformation.



The main disinformation instigators are political actors, including governments, ruling parties, and opposition parties, while key spreaders are social media "gurus" or digital "influencers" that are often paid to create or spread disinformation.



In particular, the research found that in the countries studied, governments have weaponised disinformation laws to silence critical voices. Rather than serving to counter the ills of disinformation, related laws have in most cases been used to target political critics, while government officials complicit in promoting disinformation are protected. Moreover, the retrogressive laws enacted to combat disinformation have been used to further stifle legitimate expression while hampering access to critical and pluralistic information. Some of these laws are vague and ambiguous and fail to distinguish between disinformation or falsified information, often making their enforcement open to the subjective interpretation of law enforcement agencies, who become the arbiters of the truth. The laws have been used to arrest, charge, and prosecute individuals, thereby promoting censorship and undermining legitimate speech.



In terms of the impact of disinformation on democracy and human rights, the report explains that disinformation erodes trust in democratic institutions, hampers citizens' ability to make informed decisions, and affects the right of citizens to hold individual opinions without interference. Disinformation can therefore hijack the political discourse and undermine elections by limiting access to credible, factual, and pluralistic information about candidates, parties, and issues, in order to make informed choices. When it occurs in an election context, disinformation affects electoral processes by fuelling politically motivated violence and preventing citizens and democracy actors from accessing credible, timely, and reliable information. In times of socio-economic or political crises, disinformation uses existing ethnic divisions to further divide, and it perpetuates tribal antagonisms through hate speech.



In addition, the existence of countermeasures such as unclear legal provisions further creates a climate of fear that leads to self-censorship, in the same way that internet shutdowns and content takedowns ordered by governments to limit the spread of false information instead limit access to pluralistic information. In turn, these counter-measures further restrict the participation of many citizens in online political discourse and limit their ability to express themselves without fear of retaliatory attacks.



Across all the five study countries, platforms' remedial measures to tackle misinformation and disinformation remain ineffective and inadequate.



The report offers a list of recommendations for government, intermediaries, the media and civil society. They include, for example:



Governments:

• Desist from selectively applying laws on countering disinformation to targeting critics, media, the political opposition, and human rights groups.
• Repeal repressive laws and amend existing ones such as Kenya's Computer Misuse Act, Uganda's Communications Act, Ethiopia's Hate Speech and Disinformation Prevention and Suppression Proclamation, and Cameroon's Law on Cyber Security and Cybercrime, to provide clear definitions of disinformation and ensure they conform to international human rights standards.
• Train law enforcement agencies as to what constitutes disinformation and how to combat it without stifling citizens' rights.

Intermediaries:

• Deepen collaboration with local media and civil society groups in African countries to identify, debunk, and moderate disinformation.
• Work to reduce the processing and response times for complaints regarding disinformation content reported to encourage reporting and to minimise the circulation of disinformation.
• Increase transparency in content moderation measures and conduct periodic reviews of policies with broad public consultations.

Media:

• Build the capacity of journalists and editors on fact-checking and countering disinformation online.
• Work closely with fact-checkers to identify and expose disinformation.
• Regularly report on disinformation campaigns and their effects on digital rights and democracy.
• Put in place measures and systems to enhance fact-checking and information verification.

Civil society:

• Undertake strategic litigation to challenge retrogressive laws and practices that undermine access to the internet and digital rights under the guise of fighting disinformation.
• Advocate against laws and practices that hamper the ability of journalists to provide accurate information and that hamper citizens' rights to information and free expression.
• Monitor, report, and hold states accountable for their violations of international human rights principles, including restrictions on the enjoyment of digital rights.