Disinfodemic: Deciphering COVID-19 Disinformation

"It is access to information, not disinformation, that makes the right to freedom of expression meaningful and helpful to societies."

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has coined the term "disinfodemic" to describe the COVID-19-related disinformation that is increasingly impeding access to trustworthy and reliable information and impacting lives and livelihoods around the world. The disinformation can be shared (often through the internet, where it is easily amplified) by individuals, organised groups, some news media, and official channels - wittingly or unwittingly. That is, UNESCO's focus is on the damaging effects of fabricated and misleading information, rather than the motivation for its creation and dissemination. The first of 2 UNESCO policy briefs (see Related Summaries, below), this document examines 4 dominant formats of COVID-19 disinformation, 9 main themes of the disinfodemic, and identifies 10 categories of response being mobilised - often with freedom of expression implications - around the world.

The brief points out that COVID-19-related disinformation is problematic because it can: lead to citizens endangering themselves by ignoring scientific advice; foment distrust in policymakers and governments; and divert journalists' efforts towards reactive disproving of falsehoods instead of proactive reporting of new information. UNESCO recognises that the right to information is essential to the economic, social, and cultural rights recognised by the international community - e.g., in the form of the UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16.10 on "public access to information and fundamental freedoms", which helps power other SDGs, especially SDG 3 on "good health and wellbeing".

Spreading via text, images, video, and sound, the disinfodemic has 4 main format types:

• Emotive narrative constructs and memes: False claims and textual narratives that often mix strong emotional language, lies, and/or incomplete information, and personal opinions, along with elements of truth.
• Fabricated websites and authoritative identities: False sources, polluted datasets, fake government or company websites, and websites publishing seemingly plausible information in the genre of news stories (e.g., reporting bogus cases of COVID-19).
• Fraudulently altered, fabricated, or decontextualised images and videos that are used to create confusion and generalised distrustand/or evoke strong emotions through viral memes or false stories.
• Disinformation infiltrators and orchestrated campaigns that are aimed at: sowing discord in online communities, advancing nationalism and geopolitical agendas, illicit collection of personal health data and phishing, or monetary gain from spam and advertisements for false cures. (These formats may also include artificial amplification and antagonism by bots and trolls as part of organised disinformation campaigns.)

Nine key themes of the disinfodemic identified in the brief include:

• Origins and spread of the coronavirus/COVID-19 disease (e.g., conspiracy theories, as well as the label "Chinese virus")
• False and misleading statistics (e.g., about mortality rates)
• Economic impacts (e.g., suggestions that social isolation is not economically justified)
• Discrediting of journalists and credible news outlets (e.g., unsupported accusations that certain news outlets are themselves peddling in disinformation)
• Medical science: symptoms, diagnosis, and treatment (e.g., dangerous disinformation about immunity, prevention, treatments, and cures)
• Impacts on society and the environment (e.g., panic buying triggers)
• Politicisation (e.g., one-sided and positively framed information that is presented in an effort to negate the significance of facts that are inconvenient for certain actors in power)
• Content driven by fraudulent financial gain (e.g., scams designed to steal people's private data)
• Celebrity-focused disinformation (e.g., false stories about actors being diagnosed with COVID-19)

The 10 types of disinformation responses identified in this policy brief are categorised according to their aims, rather than in terms of the actors behind them (e.g., internet communications companies, governments, news media, non-governmental organisations, or NGOs). Some actors are involved in several of these responses, which include:

• Responses that focus on identifying disinformation - includes: (i) monitoring and fact-checking responses (e.g., a large-scale effort involving fact-checking organisations in over 70 countries coordinated through the International Fact Checking Network, or IFCN); and (ii) investigative responses (i.e., digging deeper into the role of coordinated disinformation campaigns, including the originating actors, degree and means of spread, money involved, and affected communities).
• Responses governing the production and distribution of COVID-19 disinformation, with the aim of shaping the wider information and content ecosystem - includes: (i) legislative, pre-legislative, and policy responses ("even during crises...it is imperative to respect human rights, such as the right to access information, and...any limitations have to be fully justified, as well as legal, necessary and proportionate to the purpose"); and (ii) national and international counter-disinformation campaigns (e.g., mobilising online communities to help spread official public health information and to debunk false content).
• Responses to COVID-19 disinformation within production and distribution within the communications sphere, such as those in news media, social media, social messaging, and search - includes: (i) curatorial responses (e.g., changes to curb the spread of COVID-19 disinformation through the services of internet companies and to point users and audiences to authoritative sources of public health information); (ii)technical and algorithmic responses that use automation (e.g., browser plugins, mobile apps) and/or artificial intelligence, or AI); and (iii) economic responses (e.g., advertising bans and demonetisation of COVID-19 content).
• Responses aimed at supporting the intended audiences of COVID-19 disinformation campaigns - includes: (i) ethical and normative responses (e.g., published statements, speeches, or articles designed to move others to stop sharing disinformation in order to reinforce freedom of expression norms; (ii) educational responses (e.g., media and information literacy (MIL) projects (many examples are provided) and educational interventions for journalists); and (iii) empowerment and credibility labelling efforts (e.g., content verification tools, and web content indicators).

Along with the companion brief, this document invites UNESCO Member States, internet companies, news publishers, service providers and regulators, journalists, civil society organisations, and other key stakeholders to engage in a multi-stakeholder cooperation to help "flatten the curve" of the COVID-19 disinfodemic. The focus is on 4 goals designed to:

• Contain and counter falsehoods caused by misinformation and disinformation;
• Assist UNESCO Member States to align their disinfodemic responses to international human rights standards on freedom of expression, access to information, and privacy;
• Empower citizens through MIL skills; and
• Support quality independent journalism to provide verifiable and reliable information.

UNESCO's Sector for Communication and Information has published this research as part of its ongoing work to promote freedom of expression and universal access to information. The UNESCO policy briefs were supported by the International Center for Journalists (ICFJ), which is assisting journalists working on the frontlines of the disinfodemic around the world.