Use of the Internet for Political Action by Non-state Dissident Actors in the Middle East

Abstract

This paper examines how non-state dissident actors in the Middle East use the Internet for political action in the face of state-imposed constraints on Internet access. According to the author, "Non-state dissident actors have revisionist goals and the Internet offers certain advantages for accomplishing these political objectives. States seek to limit the effectiveness of these dissident objectives and can use various methods, such as limiting Internet infrastructure or imposing censorship constraints, in efforts to oppose Internet-based dissidence. In response, dedicated dissidents can find ways to overcome these state-imposed constraints and continue with their dissident activities." Based on this understanding, this paper develops a dynamic model for Internet-based dissidence and then applies it to three different case studies: The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA). "All three case study groups used the Internet in a surprisingly competent and sophisticated manner, overcoming the various state-imposed constraints on their activities. That non-state dissidents in the Middle East have successfully used the Internet for political dissidence may have important implications for the political landscape in the region."

Also discussed in brief are examples of China's Falun Gong and Mexico's Chiapas Zapatista activists who used the Internet, both through Web sites and through e-mail lists, as a forum to highlight political oppression.

Table of Contents

Introduction

• Defining terms: Non-state dissident actors
• Literature review

Argument

• Assumptions for use of Internet technology
• Advantages of the Internet for conducting political action
• Reduced transaction costs
• Altered transparency
• Constraints on Internet use
• Internet-based dissident model
• Dynamic I: Non-state dissident objectives, political action and the Internet
• Mobilization
• The Internet and mobilization
• Internationalization
• The Internet and internationalization
• Support erosion
• Internet and support erosion
• Dynamic II: State goals and access constraint
• Infrastructure constraints
• Government censorship
• Dynamic III: Dissident adjustment
• Message adjustment
• Technological adjustment
• Organizational adjustment

Case studies

1. Jordan and the Muslim Brotherhood
• Brief background
• Dynamic I: Dissident objectives, political action and the Internet
• Evidence
• Analysis
• Mobilization
• Internationalization
• Support erosion
• Dynamic II: State goals and access constraints
• Evidence
• Analysis
• Infrastructure constraints
• Government censorship
• Dynamic III: Dissident response
• Evidence
• Analysis
• Message adjustment
• Technological adjustment
• Organizational adjustment
2. Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood
   
   * same structure as case study #1
3. Saudi Arabia and the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabi
   
   * same structure as case study #1

Conclusions

• Findings
• Broader implications
• The censorable nature of the Internet
• Message segmentation
• Audience selection: Political utility vs. accessibility
• The emerging balance of power between states and dissidents

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