Gender Programming in Post-Taliban Afghanistan: The UN-Revolution

In this commentary, Carolyn D Williams looks at the complex issues faced by those seeking the development of more equal but still genuinely Afghani relationships between men and women.

Introduction

With the fall of Afghanistan's Taliban regime, the international community has been swift to support efforts to provide both emergency assistance and assistance in the reconstruction of the country and its institutions. Indeed, this might be considered an excellent opportunity to affect positive socio-political change.

Interest in the health and well-being of women is of particular interest as the Taliban had gained infamy through their extreme treatment and overtly unequal treatment of them. It is also widely-noted that “countries that promote women's equality [through access to basic services and political voice] develop more affectively, more quickly, with better health, governance, economy and general well-being.” They have lower poverty rates, faster economic growth and less corruption than countries that do not. They increase agricultural productivity, raise household incomes, raise GNP per capita, lower instances of government corruption, lower rates of child-mortality, lower rates of malnutrition and lower prevalence of HIV/AIDS.[i]

Although there is an obvious consensus that the promotion of women's interests be included in assistance programming, there is yet little consensus as to the ways in which the initiative might be addressed as a distinct priority. In planning for the authentic equity of women in Afghanistan, it will be important to build upon a clear conceptual framework that takes into consideration the circumstances particular to the Afghan situation.

Many organizations consider gender programming to be a secondary priority - less important, for example, than the provision of food and shelter. Others subvert it in fear of creating conflict with Afghani stakeholders. These responses, however, demonstrate the very sort of thinking that must be avoided. Instead of addressing gender issues independently, a holistic approach must be taken in establishing an international presence that is to assist and not to exacerbate a potentially-volatile situation.

1. Gender programming must avoid the creation of binaries and dualistic-thinking.

In the past, Afghanistan's conflicts have been characterized by revolutionary parties who seize, rather than earn their ostensible power, and who are then forcefully dismantled.[ii] Apart from a perpetual tension, this has subverted any sense of security as even those in power hold none, in any authentic sense. In seeking to account for the long-term subjugation of women, extremes must be avoided. Otherwise, the existing patriarchal mode of operation will be recreated and will, thereby, be flawed from the outset.

Revolutionary images, within this very traditional context, will also serve to provoke opposition and resistance. For example, the Taliban was successful in many more traditional areas of Afghanistan, in spite of its strict principles, as it was seen as a means of resisting the attempts of outsiders – Communists, Western or anti-Islamic culture – to revolutionize the country. The promotion of gender equity must avoid being characterized as another extremist movement, as these have – categorically – been catalysts for conflict.

In fact, in recognition that the movement of Afghani women toward an equitable existence has already begun, [the movement] might be regarded not in dualistic terms but perhaps in the form of an ascending spiral. There may not necessarily be a direct or linear movement as social transformation expands to accommodate a culture in perpetual (and sometimes dramatic) transition. One must recall that in North America – often regarded as a sublime example of gender equity – the idea of “equity” has taken on a variety of forms. Even at present, discussions and definitions do not necessarily draw consensus.

In the West, equity has often been tightly bound to the idea of freedom and it might be argued – particularly in this case – that Afghani men are no more free from social idealism than are its women. Theirs is a more privileged – but no less imposed – role. The very idea of gender equity might mean that neither men's nor women's roles are prescribed: It would cite no “end” but rather the liberty to exist in a variety of manifestations and to continue to change in accord with their environment.

2. Women's participation and social development are mutually beneficial and are, therefore, interdependent.

Improving Afghanistan's national economy, basic health and social services will, in itself, serve to improve the lives of women. Inasmuch, improving the ability of women to contribute in these areas will, in itself, improve these aspects of life in Afghanistan. However, this being the case, it is evident that neither will flourish independently of the other. Just as the strength of national social structures are fundamental to women's health and well-being, women's participation is essential to the successful development of a nation.

Andrew Mason, Senior Economist in the World Bank's Gender and Development Group has explained that:

"Experiences from cross-country analysis and case studies show that economic development and institutional change are both necessary to improve the status of women. Societies progress more rapidly if they also adopt specific measures to narrow gender gaps."

Therefore, programs seeking the general good of society might be considered “gender programming” and the inverse must also be recognized as true: Programs seeking to narrow gender gaps will improve the lot of society as a whole. When an organization cites gender programming as secondary priority, they fail to recognize women as one of their most valuable resources.

3. Gender mainstreaming cannot be imposed but must be constructed from within and must respect existing traditions and culture.

It is a common misconception that the Taliban was categorically opposed and that Taliban rule was preceded by a peaceful existence. In fact, even today there remain many supporters of the Taliban in Afghanistan and others who no less consider the Taliban mantra as their own:

"We do not accept something which somebody imposes on us under the name of human rights which is contradictory to the holy Quranic law…" [iii]

Similarly, there are many who might not have considered the Taliban to be ideal but did prefer their severe regulation to the inconsistent and unpredictable rule of Mujahideen. Others may not have supported the Taliban but are no more enthusiastic to abandon traditional and cultural practices that are Afghani and which have shaped both national and individual identity as well as religious faith.

There can be no superficial projections of what the Afghani model of gender equity will “look like.” It must not be supposed that its sublimation would appear as a perfect contrast to current styles of living (which is also not to suppose that it wouldn't). To do so would be to preclude the ability of the nation's women, to limit the scope of their freedom and to reconstruct the same model of tyranny that has served to oppress in the past.

4. Alternately, support must be lent to the creation of an enabling environment that allows for personal initiatives in these directions.

Any true form of empowerment will – definitively - require that responsibility be accepted by Afghani women. The international community, however, will be invaluable in ensuring that conditions provide Afghani women with opportunities to do so in an environment in which they are able to do so.

a) Access to health and nutrition

In the past, it has been difficult for women to access adequate amounts of food. This is not simply the result of war or of natural factors. In fact, it has often been the case that the men who collect food donated by relief agencies do not distribute it fairly and withhold portions from female beneficiaries. This has even resulted in cessation of food supplies from the United Nations. At present, many organizations are reluctant to send female aid-workers to this fundamentalist Islamic country and find that male workers are still not able to interact with women – particularly rural areas where assistance is most drastically needed. This means that it is still uncertain that women receive adequate nourishment and serves as a serious consideration in capacity-building.

Because of multiple impediments to formal education, there is a lack of trained health care workers and this, too, is most noticeable in rural areas. There is also a lack of family planning and maternal care facilities and Afghanistan experiences one of the highest infant/maternal/child mortality rates in the world.[iv] These factors must be considered in the construction of an enabling environment and the Interim Minister for Women's Affairs, Dr. Samar, has stated so among her priorities.[v]

b) Freedom to participate in politics and political representation at every level

The Interim government features a (first-ever for Afghanistan) Women's Ministry. This has been significant in acknowledging that measures specifically addressing women's situation are imperative to any progress in establishing a balanced and peaceful government. However, it is important to recognize that women must not be marginalized or the ministry allowed to serve as a token or even a “Red Herring” (to divert attention from their absence elsewhere). Women must be represented in all government ministries and also by and within the Loya Jirga[vi] that will shape the new Afghan government.

It is also important to take measures in enabling and, in fact, encouraging women to exercise their political rights and voice. They will presumably face the coercive powers of traditional and social norms, taboos and mores and this is particularly true of women outside of Kabul to whom information flows through peers in similar and more secluded environments.

Domestic violence has, in particular, served to intimidate and oppress women. Equitable laws and laws specifically protecting women and other vulnerable groups must be established, explained and their existence must be publicized. However, this is not adequate without complementary measures aimed at assisting women to exercise their legal rights. Dr. Samar has explained:

"One thing we need to do is to provide legal aid and advocate for women's rights. Maybe we can hire some lawyers who know the constitution and know the shariat. We should add some women's rights to the constitution. I would also like to give lot of training to women in human rights and gender awareness. The 1964 constitution is actually quite a good law, in terms of family law. The problem, to be honest, is that it is not really in place yet and most people-especially the women - don't know about it."[vii]

c) Creation of opportunities for education and employment

Many necessary developments will require that women be educated. The lack of women's health facilities, for example, and the lack of trained female educators has meant a lower quality of life for both sexes.

In addition, exclusion from the workforce has served to reinforce the idea that women are not actors but are to be acted upon. They are inessential.

Apart from exclusion from the workforce, interruptions and absence of girls' and women's education has resulted in an overall lack of the most basic life skills including literacy and numeracy. Apart from decreased economic opportunity, this also means that women have less access to information and even to read the Qur'an for themselves. They are dependent on second and third-hand sources and unable to consult other resources.

Women must acquire these basic skills both in order to protect and inform themselves as well as to contribute to national and household economies. Both aspects are necessary components in escaping the coercion of dependence.

Furthermore, it is through education that women will be able to enter and influence discourse, influence political change and to recognize their own abilities.

d) Respect for Afghan tradition and culture

In this time of rapid and possibly drastic change, it is important to maintain and protect those aspects of tradition, which serve to form a cultural identity. This is important as it will contribute to an environment of trust and respect and serve as a symbol of a unity within the nation. The Kabul Art Gallery and the School of music have already been restored as will be the National Museum in Kabul and the National Archives. Other countries, which have been holding Afghani artefacts may also contribute to this endeavour by returning these pieces as representative of confidence in Afghan's peaceful future.

It is also important to allow Afghani women to choose their own gender roles and to define emancipation/participation as they deem appropriate. This will require time, access to information and the opportunity for local, national and international discourse. In this respect, the international community can be instrumental in ensuring freedom of the press and for finding innovative solutions to the lack of information flowing from Kabul to the rural areas.

e) Long-term commitment

These developments will require long-term and not quick-fix solutions. International support has been remarkable, both in terms of financial, political and programmatic support. However, past experience illustrates that donors become fatigued over time and when the gravity of a situation is undermined by others more “sensational”. For gender equity programs to be helpful will require long-term commitment extending beyond the period of Afghan's popular public interest. Established programs must continue as should peacekeeping operations and crime tribunals, all of which serve to support the Afghani populace in practical and encouraging ways.

4. All players must become gender-sensitive.

It is of only limited benefit to concentrate efforts on women, which is often the case in gender-sensitization. In other cases, men have received gender-sensitization training and it has sometimes been an effective means of affecting social thought. However, as previously-stated, it is likely that similar efforts would be less effective in this case where such projects would likely appear as an imposition of Western values. In this environment, understated approaches will be more subtle – as well as more time-consuming – but will allow for the gradual and unthreatened contemplation of new ideas within Afghani culture, among both women and men. This, in itself, might be considered the best “Gender-Sensitization Program.”

Conclusion

The most effective means of gender programming will be those which are holistic and which address the most urgent challenges in development while simultaneously acknowledging the important role of women within the process. It will be based upon the assumption that women are essential players and will be carried out with their participation in all stages. For international players, this will mean: the creation of a safe environment; the creation of opportunities to participate; and the tools with which to do so.

At the same time, it will be imperative to avoid categorizing and distinguishing women's movements from other movements toward the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Initiatives should also avoid recreation of the patriarchy, which as suppressed women's freedom of choice and be careful not to simply prescribe other roles for women.

Enabling Afghani women to assist other women will be imperative as they may be better equipped to access to women in seclusion and in remote areas. They may be providers of healthcare or may simply add to the discourse surrounding women's participation. In both cases, this action will serve as an educative tool, in itself, opening up a forum for discussion and contemplation.

Communication will be an invaluable tool, eliciting both dialogue and participation and bringing into consciousness issues that might otherwise be met with resistance. Generating communication will ascribe a sense of ownership to Afghani people as they grapple with new issues. They will control both the process and the outcome of the process. [viii]

Gender mainstreaming, then, must be a priority. It must not, however, be addressed as an independent issue. As in other countries – all at various points on the upward spiral – Afghani women and men are capable of reconstructing political and social structures according to their needs. What the international community must do is to support an environment that allows for a multiplicity of voices to coexist and to continue to develop.

[i] World Bank, Engendering Development

[ii] This has been true in the cases of King Amanullah (1926), Mohammed Daoud (1973), the leftist People's Democratic Party (1978), the Mujahedin (1985) and the Taliban (1994) and certainly not exclusively as there tended to be divisions even within allegedly homogeneous parties.

[iii] Taliban Leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, 1999

[iv] UNDP

[v] UNFP, February 19, 2002

[vi] To convene in June 2002

[vii] UNFP, February 19, 2002

[viii] Freire